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Abstract—We consider a scenario in which a DoS attacker
with the limited power resource and the purpose of degrading
the system performance, jams a wireless network through which
the packet from a sensor is sent to a remote estimator to
estimate the system state. To degrade the estimation quality
most effectively with a given energy budget, the attacker aims
to solve the problem of how much power to obstruct the
channel each time, which is the recently proposed optimal attack
energy management problem. The existing works are built on an
ideal network model in which the packet dropout never occurs
when the attack is absent. To encompass wireless transmission
losses, we introduce the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio-
based network. First we focus on the case when the attacker
employs the constant power level. To maximize the expected
terminal estimation error at the remote estimator, we provide
some sufficient conditions for the existence of an explicit solution
to the optimal static attack energy management problem and
the solution is constructed. Compared with the existing result in
which corresponding sufficient conditions work only when the
system matrix is normal, the obtained conditions in this paper
are viable for a general system and shown to be more relaxed. For
the other important index of system performance, the average
expected estimation error, the associated sufficient conditions are
also derived based on a different analysis approach with the
existing work. And a feasible method is presented for both indexes
to seek the optimal constant attack power level when the system
fails to meet the proposed sufficient conditions. Then when the
real-time ACK information can be acquired, the attacker desires
a time-varying power attack strategy, based on which a Markov
decision process (MDP) based algorithm is designed to solve the
optimal dynamic attack energy management problem. We further
study the optimal tradeoff between attack energy and system
degradation. Specifically, by moving the energy constraint into
the objective function to maximize the system index and minimize
the energy consumption simultaneously, the other MDP based
algorithm is proposed to find the optimal dynamic attack power
policy which is further shown to have a monotone structure. The
theoretical results are illustrated by simulations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) tightly conjoin cyber ele-
ments and physical resources for sensing, control, communi-
cation, and computation. CPS, regarded as the next generation
engineered systems, are common in a large scope of infras-
tructures, such as transportation systems, autonomous vehicles,
smart buildings and mine monitoring, in many of which safety
is crucial [1], [2]. Nevertheless, in light of the nature of the
high openness, CPS are vulnerable to the malicious threats
from the external. This has triggered a great deal of attention
to the issues of cyber-security [3]–[10].
Researchers investigated cyber-security under some specific
attack patterns. Different attack patterns include deception
attacks [11], [12], replay attacks [13], [14], false data injection
attacks [15], and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [16]–[18].
In the current paper, we focus on DoS attacks. The adversary
launches DoS attacks to jam a wireless channel through which
useful information is transmitted. In wireless communications,
several reasons, including channel fading, scattering, signal
degradation, etc, lead to the random dropout of data packets.
Due to the interference from the attacker, the packet drops with
a larger probability. Specifically, higher jamming power leads
to a smaller signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR),
which implies a higher probability of the packet dropout [19].
It has been pointed out that a DoS attacker may be subject to
a limited energy/power budget, i.e., the attacker cannot block
the communication network ceaselessly [20]–[22]. Zhang et
al. [20] investigated how an attacker with limited ability
schedules the DoS attacks to maximize the estimation error
at the remote estimator. They also proposed the optimal DoS
attack policies to maximize the Linear Quadratic Gaussian
control cost function when the attacker cannot deteriorate the
channel quality all the time [21]. Li et al. proposed a zero-
sum game in which the sensor and the DoS attacker, both
with energy constraint, find their optimal mixed strategies to
maximize their payoff functions, and demonstrated that the
optimal strategies for these two players constitute a mixed
strategy Nash Equilibrium in [22]. All these works assumed
that the attacker can only obstruct the channel m times over
a finite time horizon T (m < T ), and focused on when
the attacker should jam the channel. However, they did not
consider which power level the DoS attacker should employ.
When taking into account the power level of the DoS
attack, the issue of finding the optimal power level that most
severely degrades the system performance follows. The recent
work in [23] considered DoS attack energy management under
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2the constraints of restricted attack power over a finite time
horizon. The local estimate of a sensor is sent to a remote
estimator through a wireless link under DoS attacks. It is
assumed that the same attack energy is used each time. They
proved that, under the same attack times, the higher attack
power, the larger the trace of expected terminal estimation
error covariance. Due to the fact that higher attack energy
leads to the smaller attack times, the attacker has to decide
how much energy to employ when launching a DoS attack.
For a special system case (the system matrix is normal),
the authors provided some sufficient conditions under which
the analytical solution to the optimal static attack energy
management problem is obtained, but failed to derive the
closed-form solution for a general system case. Zhang et al.
[24] also studied the other system performance index, the
average expected estimation error, in the setup of [23] and
obtained the corresponding sufficient conditions. In both [23]
and [24], the model of packet dropout probability is based
on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio at the receiver,
in which different attack power levels correspond to different
probabilities of packet dropout, including the level at which the
attack power is zero, i.e., there is no attack. However, like most
existing works that discard the intermittent packet dropout in
the absence of attack [16]–[18], [20], [21], Ref. [23] and [24]
also assumed that data packets will reach the remote estimator
if DoS attack does not appear, which is against the SINR-based
model and strongly restrict the application in the real scenario.
In contrast, our previous work [25] considered the scenario
of remote state estimation under DoS attacks in which the
random losses may occur even if there is no attack. Therein,
the problem of when the attacker should jam the channel is
solved, but the effect of the attack power on remote estimation
performance is neglected.
In the current work, to capture the packet dropout in wireless
channels and have an insight of how different attack power
levels would impact on the system performance, we investigate
the optimal DoS attack energy management problem over an
SINR-based network which embeds the works in [20], [23]–
[25] as special cases. The main contributions of our work
consist of the following.
1) For a general system case (not confined to the system
with a normal system matrix which the result in [23]
requires), we propose new sufficient conditions under
which the closed-form solution to the optimal static
attack energy management problem for the expected
terminal estimation error is acquired. We further prove
that the obtained sufficient conditions are more relaxed
than the ones in [23], i.e., the new conditions hold if the
ones in [23] are met.
2) Based on the network model of [24], the proposed
problem can be easily tackled. However, their proof
technique does not apply to the analysis in our setup due
to the introduction of the SINR-based network. In this
paper, by inducing a virtual random variable from the
definition of the average expected estimation error, we
are capable of using an usual stochastic order inequality
argument to proceed to the analysis. Then the associated
sufficient conditions are derived for the average expected
estimation error. When the conditions are not satisfied,
we show that the algorithm proposed in [23] and [24] is
feasible for both indexes in our setup.
3) Optimal dynamic attack energy management problems
for both indexes of system performance are solved by
a Markov decision process (MDP) based algorithm. We
further consider the optimal tradeoff problem between
attack energy and system degradation, the solution of
which can be acquired by the other MDP-based algo-
rithm. And the corresponding solution is found to have
a monotone structure, which significantly reduce the
computational complexity of the proposed algorithm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II formulates the problem of interest. In section III, we focus
on the expected terminal estimation error. We present some
sufficient conditions under which the optimal attack power
level can be obtained explicitly. Then we prove that our
proposed conditions are more relaxed than the existing work.
Methods are presented to solve the optimal static attack energy
management problem when the sufficient conditions fail to
hold. Section IV derives the results for the average expected
estimation error. The corresponding sufficient conditions and
closed-form attack power level are derived. Corresponding
methods are also provided when the sufficient conditions are
not met. In section V, we formulate the optimal dynamic attack
energy management problem for both indexes and design a
MDP-based algorithm to solve it. Section VI considers the
tradeoff between attack energy and system degradation. The
optimal solution which offers best tradeoff can be obtained
by the other MDP-based algorithm and is shown to have a
monotone structure. Numerical simulations are provided in
section VII to demonstrate the theoretical results. Finally, some
concluding remarks appear in section VIII.
Notations: Sn+ is the set of n by n positive semi-definite
matrices. X1 ≤ X2 means (X2 − X1) ∈ Sn+, and X1 > 0
denotes that X1 is positive definite. Denote by Z+ the set of
positive integers. Pr(A) stands for the probability of an event
A and Pr(A|B) for the conditional probability given an event
B. The mean of random variable X is denoted as E[X], and
E[X|A] is the conditional expectation of X given an event
A. Tr(·) denotes the trace of matrix. The superscript ′ stands
for transposition. For function h, hk(X) , h(hk−1(X)), with
h0(X) , X .
II. PROBLEM SETUP
The system in Fig. 1 is considered. A linear time-invariant
(LTI) process is run by the plant, and the sensor takes the
measurement of the state in the plant, as follows.
xk+1 = Axk + wk,
yk = Cxk + vk,
where k ∈ Z+, xk, wk ∈ Rn and yk, vk ∈ Rm are the process
state, the process noise that is zero-mean Gaussian noise with
covariance Q > 0, the measurement taken by the sensor, and
the measurement noise that is zero-mean Gaussian noise with
covariance R > 0, respectively, at time k. Furthermore, wk and
3vk are uncorrelated. Assume that the pair (A,C) is detectable
and (A,
√
Q) is controllable.
At time k, after obtaining the measurement data yk, the
sensor with sufficient computation ability runs a Kalman filter
which generates the minimum mean squared error (MMSE)
estimate xˆsk = E[xk|y1, . . . , yk], with the corresponding error
covariance P sk = E[(xk− xˆsk)(xk− xˆsk)
′ |y1, . . . , yk]. Then the
data packet, xˆsk, is transmitted from the sensor with the power
δs to a remote estimator over a wireless network. Consider
the state estimation at the remote estimator within a finite
time horizon T , with the wireless channel under DoS attacks
δ
∆
= {δ1, δ2, . . . , δT }, where δk is the attack power at time k.
Let λk = 1 if δk > 0, and λk = 0 if δk = 0. Assume the same
power is employed when jamming the channel, i.e., δk = δa
if λk = 1. Then from [20], the following equality describes
the estimation procedure of the state estimate xˆk at the remote
estimator:
xˆk = θk(δ)xˆ
s
k + (1− θk(δ))Axˆk−1, k = 1, 2, . . . , T,
where θk = 1 if the packet arrives at the estimator at time k
and θk = 0, otherwise. The DoS attacker has a limited energy
resource, which is formulated as
∑T
k=1 δk ≤ ∆.When δ is
given, θk’s are assumed to be i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables,
and the corresponding probability distribution follows
p˜k(δ) = Pr(θk = 1) = 1− βk, (1)
where βk is the packet dropout probability under the DoS
attack with the power δk. The packet dropout probability at
time k is decided by the SINR of the remote estimator at time
k which is defined by [19]
ρk =
δsGs
δkGa + σ2
, (2)
where Gs and Ga are the channel gains for the sensor and the
attacker respectively and σ2 is the noise power.
Assume that the packet is composed with L bits, and the bit
error rate for each bit is identical. The packet dropout takes
place if there exists one bit that is received mistakenly. Then
from [19], there holds
p˜k = [1−Q(
√
2ρk)]
L, (3)
where Q(x) = 1/√2pi ∫ +∞
x
e−t
2/2dt. And βk = 1− p˜k.
In the Kalman filter, P sk will converge exponentially to the
steady-state value, P . Similar to [22], assume the Kalman
filter is in steady-state, which implies P sk = P , k ≥ 0. Then
according to [20], the error covariance Pk of xˆk follows:
Pk = θkP + (1− θk)h(Pk−1), k = 1, 2, . . . , T, (4)
where h(X) , AXA′ +Q. And similar to [25], it is assumed
throughout the paper that the data packet which contains the
information of xˆs0 successfully arrives at the remote estimator
at time k = 0, i.e., P0 = P .
Two types of indexes are adopted to measure the perfor-
mance of remote estimation in existing works [20], [22], [23],
[26], [27]. They are respectively the expected terminal estima-
tion error covariance called Terminal Error JT = E[PT (δ)],
and the average expected estimation error covariance called
Fig. 1. System architecture.
Average Error JA = 1T
∑T
k=1 E[Pk(δ)]. The attacker subject
to the limited energy budget expects to deteriorate the remote
estimation performance as much as possible:
Problem 1:
max
δ∈Θ
Tr[Je(δ)]
s.t.
T∑
k=1
δk ≤ ∆,
δ ≤ δa ≤ δ,
where, Je = JT or Je = JA, Θ = {0, δa}T is the set of all
possible attack power allocations, and δ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δT }, δ
and δ are the lower bound and upper bound of attack power,
respectively.
III. OPTIMAL STATIC ATTACK ENERGY MANAGEMENT
FOR TERMINAL ERROR
We first work on the terminal error. In this section, the
optimal attack energy management for maximizing the trace
of the terminal error is presented. The analysis of Problem 1
for the terminal error in detail is provided.
A. Optimal Attack Schedule For Terminal Error
When the constant attack power δa is given, the attack times
can be computed by n = b∆/δac. We denote the probability
of packet dropout by β when δk = δa, and α when δk = 0.
Then, for a given δa, we need first solve the problem of when
to jam the channel:
Problem 2:
max
λ∈Λ
Tr[JT (λ)]
s.t.
T∑
k=1
λk = n,
where, Λ = {0, 1}T is the set of all possible attack schedules,
and λ = {λ1, λ2, . . . , λT }.
From [25], the optimal attack schedule for Problem 2 is
given by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 ( [25]): The optimal solution to Problem 2 is
λ∗ = (0, 0, · · · , 0, 1, 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
),
and the trace of corresponding expected terminal estimation
error is
Tr(JTmax) = Tr
[ n−1∑
i=0
(1− β)βihi(P ) + αT−nβnhT (P )
+
T−1∑
i=n
(1− α)αi−nβnhi(P )
]
(5)
4B. Sufficient Conditions
It is difficult to give a closed-form solution to Problem 1 for
the terminal error if no restriction is imposed on the system pa-
rameters. This subsection presents some sufficient conditions
under which the closed-form solution can be derived.
When the probability of packet dropout x is given, we can
obtain the corresponding attack power δa(x) based on (1)–
(3). Denote Sn = {x|b∆/δa(x)c = n} as the set of the
packet dropout probability with the capability of launching
n times attacks for the adversary. Before proceeding further,
the following two lemmas are needed.
Lemma 2 ( [20] ): For function h defined in Section II, the
following holds
P ≤ h(P ) ≤ h2(P ) ≤ · · · ≤ hk(P ) ≤ · · · ,∀k ∈ Z+.
Lemma 3: If β1, β2 ∈ Sn, and β1 > β2, then the attack
strategy in Lemma 1 is optimal for β1 and β2. And there holds
Tr(JTmax)(β1) > Tr(J
T
max)(β2).
Proof: According to (5), it follows that
JTmax = P +
n∑
i=1
βiHi +
T∑
i=n+1
βnαi−nHi, (6)
where Hi = hi(P )− hi−1(P ).
From (6) and Lemma 2, it is easy to see that
Tr(JTmax)(β1) > Tr(J
T
max)(β2),
which completes the proof.
Then the following proposition shows the effect of attack
times on the system performance measured by the terminal
error. Specifically, more attack times lead to larger trace of
the terminal error if some conditions are satisfied.
Proposition 1: Let n = b∆/δc and n = b∆/δc. Suppose
θ ∈ Sn and β ∈ Sn+1, where n ≤ n ≤ n−1. If the following
conditions are met:
1) ∀t1, t2 ∈ Z+, and t1 ≤ t2, there holds Tr(Ht1) ≤
Tr(Ht2).
2) the probabilities satisfy
n−1∑
i=1
(β
i − βi) + (αβn−1 − βn)
T−n∑
i=0
αi ≤ 0,
where β and β are the lower bound and upper bound of
packet dropout probability, which are corresponding to
the upper bound and lower bound of the attack power,
respectively,
then we have
Tr(JTmax)(θ) ≤ Tr(JTmax)(β).
Proof: See the Appendix.
C. Closed-form Solution
Now the main conclusion is provided as follows.
Theorem 1: Let n = b∆/δc and n = b∆/δc. If conditions
1) and 2) in Proposition 1 are satisfied, then the optimal attack
power level for the terminal error is
δa∗ =
{
arg max {δa|b∆/δac = n}, for n < n,
δ, for n = n,
(7)
the solution to Problem 1 for the terminal error is
δ∗ = (0, 0, · · · , 0, δa∗ , δa∗ , · · · , δa∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
),
and the trace of the corresponding expected terminal error
covariance is
Tr(JTmax) =Tr
[ n−1∑
i=0
(1− β∗)βi∗hi(P ) + αT−nβn∗ hT (P )
+
T−1∑
i=n
(1− α)αi−nβn∗ hi(P )
]
,
where β∗ = 1 − p˜k(δa∗) is the packet dropout probability
corresponding to the optimal DoS attack power.
Proof: To maximize the terminal error, due to Lemma
1 and Proposition 1, the attacker will block the channel n
times. From Lemma 3, the attacker will employ the larger
power level. Hence, the conclusion in Theorem 1 holds.
From Theorem 1, the attacker should adopt the largest power
level among the power level set in which any power level
leads to most attack times, and then consecutively jam the
channel in the end of the considered time horizon to maximize
the terminal error when the proposed sufficient conditions are
satisfied.
For any given plant, satisfaction of the condition 1) in
Proposition 1 can be checked. However, it is not easy to check
for large dimension of the system matrix, which motivates the
sufficient condition in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: For function h defined in Section II, the
condition 1) of Proposition 1 holds if λmin(A′A) ≥ 1, where
λmin(A
′A) is the minimum eigenvalue of A′A.
Proof: It suffices to prove the case that t2 = t1 + 1.
Since
ht1+1(P )− ht1(P ) = Aht1(P )A′ −Aht1−1(P )A′
=A[ht1(P )− ht1−1(P )]A′, (8)
based on the facts that Tr(ABC) = Tr(CAB) and Tr(A +
B) = Tr(A) + Tr(B), there holds
Tr{ht1+1(P )− ht1(P )} − Tr{ht1(P )− ht1−1(P )}
=Tr{A′A[ht1(P )− ht1−1(P )]} − Tr{ht1(P )− ht1−1(P )}
=Tr{(A′A− I)[ht1(P )− ht1−1(P )]}. (9)
Since λmin(A′A) ≥ 1, we have A′A−I ∈ Sn+, which causes,
from Lemma 1, that
Tr{ht1+1(P )− ht1(P )} − Tr{ht1(P )− ht1−1(P )} ≥ 0.
The proof is completed.
5Note that Corollary 1 provides a sufficient condition under
which the condition 1) of Proposition 1 holds, i.e., the con-
dition 1) of Proposition 1 may hold even if λmin(A′A) < 1.
This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 1: A =
[
1.2 0.1
0 1
]
, C =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, Q =
[
1 0
0 2
]
,
R = 0.5C. The eigenvalues of A′A are 0.9788 and 1.4712.
Hence we have λmin(A′A) < 1. We can run a Kalman filter
to obtain the steady-state error covariance P , and compute the
difference
h(P )− P =
[
1.1709 0.0418
0.0418 2.0000
]
. (10)
Similar to (8), there holds
ht1(P )− ht1−1(P ) = At1−1[h(P )− P ](At1−1)′. (11)
It is easy to verify that each element of the matrix A′A − I
is greater than 0, which leads to, from (9)–(11),
Tr{ht1+1(P )− ht1(P )} − Tr{ht1(P )− ht1−1(P )}
= Tr{(At1−1)′(A′A− I)At1−1[h(P )− P ]} ≥ 0.
D. Comparison with Existing Results
In this subsection, Theorem 1 is compared with the existing
results in [23].
Definition 1 (Normal matrix [28]): A square matrix A is
normal if A∗A = AA∗, where A∗ is the conjugate transpose
of A.
Lemma 4 ( [23]): When α = 0, the optimal attack power
level for the terminal error is (7) if the following conditions
are satisfied:
1) matrix A is normal,
2) all the eigenvalues of the matrix A′A, λ(A′A), satisfy1
1 < λ(A′A) <
1
β
[1− (β − β
βn+1
)1/2]. (12)
Next we show that the conditions in Proposition 1 are more
relaxed than the ones in Lemma 4.
We have λ(A′A) > 1, if (12) holds. Then from Corollary
1, it is easy to see that, the condition 1) of Proposition 1 is
true if the condition 2) of Lemma 4 holds.
When α = 0, the condition 2) in Proposition 1 turns into
n−1∑
i=1
(β
i − βi)− βn ≤ 0. (13)
Since
β
i − βi = (β − β)
i−1∑
k=0
β
i−k−1
βk ≤ (β − β)iβi−1,
there holds
n−1∑
i=1
(β
i − βi)− βn ≤ (β − β)
n−1∑
i=1
iβ
i−1
=(β − β)[1− β
n−1
(1− β)2 −
(n− 1)βn−1
1− β ]− β
n, (14)
1There is a typo in [23].
If (12) is met, it follows that
1 <
1
β
[1− (β − β
βn+1
)1/2],
which amounts to
1
(1− β)2 <
βn+1
β − β .
Then in light of the above inequality, the last term in (14)
is smaller than
βn+1 − βn − βn+1βn−1 − (n− 1)β
n−1
(β − β)
1− β ≤ 0,
which leads to, due to (14), the inequality (13).
Therefore, the condition 2) in Proposition 1 is satisfied if
the condition 2) in Lemma 4 holds.
Remark 1: To summarize, the conditions in Proposition 1
hold if the conditions in Lemma 4 are satisfied, which means
that the conditions in Proposition 1 are more relaxed. Besides,
from the derivation above, just two inequalities, λ(A′A) > 1
and 1
β
[1 − ( β−β
βn+1
)1/2] > 1, are employed. Hence, compared
with [23], to obtain the closed-form solution, it is no longer
required that the system matrix A is normal, and no upper
bound is imposed on λ(A′A), which largely improves the
applicability.
E. Exhaustion Search Method
When the conditions in Proposition 1 are not met, (7) may
not be the optimal one. But from Lemma 3, we can transform
Problem 1 for the terminal error into an equivalent problem:
Problem 3:
max Tr[JTmax(δ)]
s.t. (δa,M) ∈ Ω,
where, δ = (0, 0, · · · , 0, δa, δa, · · · , δa︸ ︷︷ ︸
M times
), Ω =
{
(f(n), n), n =
n, n + 1, · · · , n
}
, and f(n) = arg max{x|b∆/xc = n, δ ≤
x ≤ δ}.
It is easy to see that the solution space of Problem 3 is
discrete. For a given (δa,M) ∈ Ω, we can compute the
corresponding α and β based on (1)–(3). Then Tr[JTmax(δ)]
can be acquired from (5). Finally, an exhaustion search method
can be adopted to solve Problem 3. Note that, from the
constraint set Ω, no more than T steps are required to obtain
the solution, which implies that this method is feasible.
IV. OPTIMAL STATIC ATTACK ENERGY MANAGEMENT
FOR AVERAGE ERROR
In this section, we focus on the other important system in-
dex, the average error. The optimal attack energy management
for maximizing the trace of the average error is presented. We
also provide the detailed analysis of Problem 1 for the average
error.
6A. Optimal Attack Schedule For Average Error
The scenario for the average error is far more complicated
than the one for the terminal error. To facilitate the subsequent
analysis, we first introduce the representation of the attack
schedule. An attack schedule, in which n attacks are launched
over a finite horizon T , can be denoted by
(γd, λk1 , γd1 , λk2 , . . . , λks , γds),
where s ≥ 1, λki is the ith consecutive jamming sequence
with the length ki ≥ 1, i = 1, . . . , s, γd and γdj , respectively,
denote the first and the (j+ 1)th consecutive sequence during
which no attack is launched with the length dj ≥ 1, j =
1, . . . , s− 1, d ≥ 0 and ds ≥ 0, i.e.,
(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
d times
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k1 times
, 0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ks times
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
ds times
),
where
∑s
i=1 ki = n, and d+
∑s
j=1 dj = T − n.
Similar to Section III, we first solve the following problem:
Problem 4:
max
λ∈Λ
Tr[JA(λ)]
s.t.
T∑
k=1
λk = n,
where, Λ = {0, 1}T is the set of all possible attack schedules,
and λ = {λ1, λ2, . . . , λT }.
From [25], the optimal attack schedule for Problem 4 is
given by the following lemma.
Lemma 5 ( [25]): The solution to Problem 4 is λ∗ =
(γm, λn, γs), i.e.,
λ∗ = (0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
),
where m + s = T − n, and |m− s| ≤ 1, i.e., m = s or
|m− s| = 1. And JA[(γm, λn, γs)] = JA[(γs, λn, γm)]. De-
note by pi,k the probability that Pk = hi(P ), i = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Then the corresponding average expected estimation error can
be calculated based on the expression
JAmax =
1
T
T∑
k=1
T∑
i=0
pi,k(λ∗)hi(P ).
To obtain pi,k, from (4) and the assumption that xˆs0 arrives,
it follows that pi,k = 0 when k < i. When k ≥ i,
Pk = h
i(P ) if and only if xˆsk−i arrives, and meanwhile
xˆsk−i+1, xˆ
s
k−i+2, . . . , xˆ
s
k drop. Note that θk’s are independent.
Hence, pi,k = p˜k−iq˜k−i+1q˜k−i+2 · · · q˜k when k ≥ i, where
q˜k = 1 − p˜k is the corresponding dropout probability of
packets. And there holds p˜0 = 1 due to the assumption that
xˆs0 arrives.
In [24], JA(λ) has a simple and tractable expression because
of the assumption that the packet dropout probability without
attack is α = 0. In our setup, however, the corresponding
analysis is more difficult since α > 0. Hence, we need a
different analysis approach from the one in [24] to tackle
Problem 1 for the average error, as will be presented in the
next subsection.
B. Sufficient Conditions
For ease of illustration, we rewrite the optimal attack
schedule in Lemma 5 as φ1 = (γm, λn, γs), and let φ2 =
(γm, λn+1, γs−1). To guarantee that φ2 is the optimal attack
schedule for the average error under n+ 1 attacks, let m = s
or m = s− 1.
We aim to compare the effects of two kinds of attack
schedules φ1 and φ2 on the system performance, which help
us have an insight of the effect of attack times. To do this, we
have, from Lemma 5,
JAmax(φ
1)− JAmax(φ2) =
1
T
T∑
i=0
hi(P )Fi, (15)
where Fi =
∑T
k=1[pi,k(φ
1)− pi,k(φ2)].
Observing the above equation, two random variables can
be induced from (15). First, note that { 1T
∑T
k=1 pi,k, i =
0, 1, . . . , T} is a probability distribution associated with some
random variable since 0 ≤ 1T
∑T
k=1 pi,k ≤ 1, i = 0, 1, . . . , T
and
∑T
i=0
1
T
∑T
k=1 pi,k = 1. Then we can obtain two
induced random variables X with probability distribution
Pr(X = Tr[hi(P )]) = 1T
∑T
k=1 pi,k(φ
1), i = 0, 1, . . . , T
and Y with probability distribution Pr(Y = Tr[hi(P )]) =
1
T
∑T
k=1 pi,k(φ
2), i = 0, 1, . . . , T . And we readily have
E[X] = Tr(JAmax)(φ1) and E[Y ] = Tr(JAmax)(φ2).
Before proceeding further, we present the following defini-
tion and lemma.
Definition 2 ( [29] ): Let X1 and X2 be two random vari-
ables. X1 is said to be smaller than X2 in the usual stochastic
order (denoted by X1 ≤st X2) if Pr(X1 ≤ x) ≥ Pr(X2 ≤ x)
for all x ∈ (−∞,∞).
Lemma 6 (Usual Stochastic Order Inequality [29] ): If
X1 ≤st X2, then E[X1] ≤ E[X2].
Combining Lemma 2, we can see that Pr(X ≤ x) = 0
for x < Tr[P ], Pr(X ≤ x) = ∑ij=0 1T ∑Tk=1 pj,k(φ1) for
Tr[hi(P )] ≤ x < Tr[hi+1(P )], i = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, and
Pr(X ≤ x) = 1 for x ≥ Tr[hT (P )], to which Pr(Y ≤ x) has
the similar structure. From Lemma 6, the sign judgement of
equation (15) can be recast as the check of whether there exists
the relationship in Definition 2 between the induced random
variables X and Y . Based on the above analysis, we focus on
the term Vi =
∑i
j=0 Fj , for i = 0, . . . , T − 1 in the sequel,
where Fj =
∑T
k=1[pj,k(φ
1)− pj,k(φ2)].
Suppose θ ∈ Sn and β ∈ Sn+1. Note that there are n times
attacks in φ1 and n+ 1 times attacks in φ2. Hence, the packet
dropout probability in the presence of attack is θ under φ1 and
β under φ2. And thereby, Vi refers to Vi(m,n, s, θ, β). How
to calculate Vi is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 7: For simplicity, we write Vi(m,n, s, θ, β) as Vi
in this lemma. Let N = n+ s and s < n. There holds
Vi = (n− i+ 1)βi+1 − (n− i)θi+1 − αi+1
+ 2
i∑
j=1
αj(βi−j+1 − θi−j+1), (16)
for i = 0, . . . , s− 1, and
Vi = (T − i)(αi−nβn+1 − αi−n+1θn), (17)
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When m = s, Vi is given by
Vi = (n− i+ 1)βi+1 − (n− i)θi+1 + αsβi−s+1
− 2αsθi−s+1 + 2
s−1∑
j=1
αj(βi−j+1 − θi−j+1), (18)
for i = s, . . . , n, and
Vi = α
sβi−s+1 − 2αsθi−s+1
+ 2
s−1∑
j=i−n+1
αj(βi−j+1 − θi−j+1)
+ (i− n+ 1)αi−nβn+1 − (i− n)αi−n+1θn, (19)
for i = n+ 1, . . . , N − 1.
When m = s− 1, Vi takes the form of
Vi = (n− i+ 1)βi+1 − (n− i)θi+1 − αsθi+1−s
+ 2
s−1∑
j=1
αj(βi−j+1 − θi−j+1), (20)
for i = s, . . . , n, and
Vi = − αsθi−s+1 + 2
s−1∑
j=i−n+1
αj(βi−j+1 − θi−j+1)
+ (i− n+ 1)αi−nβn+1 − (i− n)αi−n+1θn, (21)
for i = n+ 1, . . . , N − 1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Next we present some results on the sign of Vi.
Lemma 8: Let n = b∆/δc and n = b∆/δc. For any attack
times n with n ≤ n ≤ n − 1, we have Vi ≥ 0, for i =
0, . . . , T − 1, if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) 2αβ
n−1 − βn ≤ 0,
2) Vi(m,n, s, β, β) ≥ 0, for i = 0, . . . , T − 1, n = n −
1, and n = n, where α, β and β are the same with
Proposition 1, m+s = T −n, and m = s or m = s−1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 2: Lemma 7 presents the expression of Vi for s < n
which matters in the proof of Lemma 8. As shown in the end
of the proof of Lemma 8, the case when s ≥ n is totally similar
and is omitted for brevity. And note that it is beneficial for
the proof of Lemma 8 but inconvenient for the verification of
the conditions of Lemma 8 to employ the expression of Vi.
It is easier to adopt numerical methods to compute Vi based
on its definition Vi =
∑i
j=0 Fj when verifying the proposed
sufficient conditions.
Then similar to Proposition 1, we present the following
proposition to show the effect of attack times on the remote
estimation performance measured by the average error.
Proposition 2: Let n = b∆/δc. Suppose θ ∈ Sn and β ∈
Sn+1, where n ≤ n ≤ n − 1. If the conditions in Lemma 8
are met, then we have
Tr(JAmax)(θ) ≤ Tr(JAmax)(β).
Proof: We have Pr(X ≤ x) ≥ Pr(Y ≤ x) for all x ∈
(−∞,∞) since Vi ≥ 0, for i = 0, . . . , T − 1. And thereby
there holds X ≤st Y , which leads to, due to (15) and Lemma
6, Tr(JAmax)(θ) ≤ Tr(JAmax)(β). The proof is completed.
C. Closed-form Solution
The following lemma is needed before presenting the main
result.
Lemma 9: If β1, β2 ∈ Sn, and β1 > β2, then the attack
strategy in Lemma 5 is optimal for β1 and β2. And there holds
Tr(JAmax)(β1) > Tr(J
A
max)(β2).
Proof: A direct result from Lemma 5.
Now the main conclusion is provided as follows.
Theorem 2: Let n = b∆/δc and n = b∆/δc. If conditions
1) and 2) in Lemma 8 are satisfied, then the optimal attack
power level for the average error is
δa∗ =
{
arg max {δa|b∆/δac = n}, for n < n,
δ, for n = n,
(22)
the solution to Problem 1 for the average error is
δ∗ = (0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, δa∗ , δ
a
∗ , . . . , δ
a
∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
),
where m + s = T − n, and |m− s| ≤ 1, i.e., m = s
or |m− s| = 1, and the corresponding average expected
estimation error can be calculated based on Lemma 5.
Proof: To maximize the average error, in light of Lemma
5 and Proposition 2, the attacker will block the channel n
times. From Lemma 9, the attacker will employ the larger
power level. Hence, the conclusion in Theorem 2 holds.
To maximize the average error, from Theorem 2, the attacker
should adopt the same action with the one for the terminal
error except that the attacker should consecutively jam the
channel in the middle of the considered time horizon when
the proposed sufficient conditions hold.
D. Exhaustion Search Method
When the conditions in Lemma 8 are not met, (22) may not
be the optimal one. Similar to the scenario for the terminal
error, from Lemma 9, we can transform Problem 1 for the
average error into an equivalent problem:
Problem 5:
max Tr[JAmax(δ)]
s.t. (δa,M) ∈ Ω,
where, δ = (0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, δa, δa, . . . , δa︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
s times
), m + s =
T − n, |m− s| ≤ 1, i.e., m = s or |m− s| = 1,
Ω =
{
(f(n), n), n = n, n + 1, · · · , n
}
, and f(n) =
arg max{x|b∆/xc = n, δ ≤ x ≤ δ}.
Similarly, an exhaustion search method can be adopted to
solve Problem 5, with no more than T steps required to obtain
the solution.
V. OPTIMAL DYNAMIC ATTACK ENERGY MANAGEMENT
The case when the attacker jams the channel with the
constant energy is discussed in the previous sections. In this
section we assume that the adversary has the capabilities of
intercepting the real-time ACK information which indicates
the arrival of packets or not, and dynamically adjusting the
8jamming energy based on the ACK signal. Then the optimal
dynamic attack energy management problem arises.
More specifically, different from the static case where the
attack strategy is limited to the set Θ = {0, δa}T , here the
attack power δk is dependent on the error Pk−1 and the
available power Ek, i.e., the adversary has the attack policy
δ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δT } with δk = δk(Pk−1, Ek). And similar to
[23], [26], [30], assume that the attacker has the discrete set
of available power level Φ = {0, δ, e1, e2, . . . , en, δ} with n
finite and 0 < δ < e1 < · · · < en < δ. Then the optimal
dynamic attack energy management problem is formulated as
follows.
Problem 6:
max
δ
Tr[Je(δ)]
s.t.
T∑
k=1
δk ≤ ∆,
δk ∈ Φ.
To solve Problem 6, we formulate it as a finite Markov
decision problem based on the Markov decision process
(MDP) {T + 1,S,A, P r(·|·, ·), rk(·, ·)} with the initial state
s1 = (P ,∆). More specifically, T + 1 is the considered time
horizon.2 The state space is defined as S = SP × SE , where
SP = {P , h(P ), h2(P ), . . .} is a countable set associated with
the estimation error covariance and SE = {E1, E2, . . . , Er}
is the set of all the possible available power level at each
time instant. And the state at time k is defined as sk =
(Pk−1, Ek) ∈ S. The iteration processes of Pk and Ek are
(4) and Ek = Ek−1 − δk−1, respectively.
Then we define the action space as A = Φ. For a given
state s = (hi(P ), Ej), the set of allowable actions in state s
is As = Φ
⋂
[0, Ej ], and thereby, at time k, the attacker can
choose an action ak from Ask for k = 1, . . . , T .
We further present the probability Pr(sk+1|sk, ak) that the
state changes from sk = (hi(P ), Ej) to sk+1 with action ak
taken at time k for k = 1, . . . , T . From the iteration process
of sk, we have
Pr(sk+1|sk, ak)
=
 βk, if sk+1 = (h
i+1(P ), Ej − ak),
1− βk, if sk+1 = (P ,Ej − ak),
0, otherwise,
(23)
where i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., j = 1, . . . , r and the dropout probability
βk can be obtained from (1)–(3).
The one-stage reward function at time k is defined as
rk(sk, ak) for k = 1, . . . , T + 1. Note that rT+1 =
rT+1(sT+1) = 0 since no decision is made at time T + 1
and thereby no reward is provided. And except the first time
instant k = 1, rk is random due to the randomness of sk. The
explicit expression of rk will be presented in the sequel.
The attack policy δ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δT } with δk =
δk(Pk−1, Ek) is a deterministic Markovian policy for the
2We consider T + 1 instead of T since the error PT and the available
power level ET+1 at time T + 1, i.e., the state sT+1, is obtained after the
decision is made at time T . But no decision is made at time T + 1 and the
process ceases.
Algorithm 1: Backward Induction Algorithm
Input: T ;Sk;As;Pr; rk; s1 = (P ,∆)
Output: Maximum total reward Rδ
∗
T+1(s1) = u
∗
1(s1);
Optimal deterministic Markovian policy
δ∗ = {δ∗1 , δ∗2 , . . . , δ∗T }
1 Set k = T + 1 and u∗T+1(s) = rT+1(s) for all s ∈ Sk.
2 while k > 1 do
3 Let k = k − 1 and compute u∗k(s) for each s ∈ Sk by
u∗k(s) = max
a∈As
{
rk(s, a) +
∑
j∈Sk
Pr(j|s, a)u∗k+1(j)
}
.
Set for each s ∈ Sk
A∗s,k = arg max
a∈As
{
rk(s, a)+
∑
j∈Sk
Pr(j|s, a)u∗k+1(j)
}
.
Let δ∗k(s) ∈ A∗s,k for each s ∈ Sk.
4 end
above MDP [31]. The usual optimality criteria [31] for the
above finite MDP with the initial state s1 and the adopted
policy δ is the expected total reward over the time horizon
T + 1 which is defined by
RδT+1(s1) = Eδs1
[ T∑
k=1
rk(sk, ak) + rT+1(sT+1)
]
.
Based on RδT+1(s1), we can obtain the terminal error J
T
by defining rk(·, ·) as rk(s, a) = 0 for k = 1, . . . , T − 1 and
rk(s, a) = Tr(E[PT ]) for k = T , and T · JA by defining
rk(s, a) = Tr(E[Pk]) for k = 1, . . . , T when the sample of sk
is s and the sample of ak is a, where E[Pk] = (1−βk(a))P +
βk(a)h(Pk−1(s)).
For a given sample of st, s, define uδt for t < T + 1 by
uδt (s) = Eδs
[ T∑
k=t
rk(sk, ak) + rT+1(sT+1)
]
,
from which it is easy to see that RδT+1(s) = u
δ
1(s), and let
uδT+1(s) = rT+1(s). Further let Sk = SkP × SE , where SkP =
{P , h(P ), . . . , hk(P )}. Then according to [31], Problem 6
for both indexes can be solved by the backward induction
algorithm (Algorithm 1) respectively through inputting the
corresponding rk. Note that in Algorithm 1, Sk is used instead
of S. This is from the fact that SkP includes all the possible
value of Pk due to (4) and the given initial state s1 = (P ,∆),
and thereby there is no need to compute all s ∈ S. And we
can see from Algorithm 1 that δ∗ may be not unique which
occurs if A∗s,k contains more than one action for some s and
k. We just need to retain a single action from A∗s,k at this time
to acquire a particular optimal policy.
VI. OPTIMAL TRADEOFF BETWEEN ATTACK ENERGY
CONSUMPTION AND SYSTEM DEGRADATION
The case when the attacker has the fixed total energy
constraint ∆ is discussed in the previous sections. It is well-
known that more attack energy used leads to more system
degradation but more energy consumption. The attacker may
9desire a tradeoff between energy expense and system degra-
dation by decreasing the employed attack energy at the cost
of weakening the attack effect. Then one question arises that
how much energy the attacker should decrease to achieve the
optimal tradeoff? To answer this question, here we propose
the modified Markov decision problem based on Section V.
The modified parts are presented as follows.
With no total energy restriction imposed, the state space in
this section is defined as S˜ = SP and the state at time k as
s˜k = Pk−1 ∈ S˜. The action space is still A˜ = Φ but for any
given state s, the attacker can choose an action a from A˜s = A˜.
And the one-stage reward function at time k is R(s˜k, ak).
Corresponding to the terminal error JT and the average error
JA, we can respectively design that Rk(s, a) = −ωa for
k = 1, . . . , T − 1 and rk(s, a) = Tr(E[PT ])− ωa for k = T ,
and Rk(s, a) = Tr(E[Pk]) − ωa for k = 1, . . . , T when
the sample of s˜k is s and the sample of ak is a, where
E[Pk] = (1 − βk(a))P + βk(a)h(s) and ω > 0 is the
weighting parameter. From the design of Rk, the modified
objective is to maximize the attack effect and minimize the
energy expense simultaneously. Similar objective function
appears in [32], [33]. We call the modified Markov decision
problem the optimal tradeoff problem between attack energy
and system degradation, which is based on the modified MDP
{T + 1, S˜, A˜, P r(·|·, ·), Rk(·, ·)} with the initial state s˜1 = P .
And the corresponding R˜δT+1(s˜1) and u˜
δ
t (s) can be obtained
by replacing rk and s1 in RδT+1(s1) and u
δ
t (s) with Rk and
s˜1, respectively.
Before presenting the algorithm that solves the proposed
optimal tradeoff problem, we derive some structural results for
the corresponding optimal policy. To do this, first the following
definition is introduced.
Definition 3 ( [31]): Let Xˆ and Yˆ be partially ordered sets
and g(x, y) a real-valued function on Xˆ× Yˆ . We say that g is
superadditive if for x+ ≥ x− in Xˆ and y+ ≥ y− in Yˆ , there
holds
g(x+, y+) + g(x−, y−) ≥ g(x+, y−) + g(x−, y+).
Then the following theorem provides some structural results
for the optimal policy δ∗k.
Theorem 3: There exist optimal decision rules δ∗k(s) which
are nondecreasing in s for k = 1, . . . , T .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 3 is desirable since it helps reduce the search range
when seeking the optimal policy. Specifically, the monotone
backward induction algorithm (Algorithm 2) in which S˜k =
SkP is presented to solve the optimal tradeoff problem.
VII. SIMULATIONS AND EXAMPLES
In this section we show the system performance under the
proposed DoS attack with the optimal attack power level for
the terminal error and the average error, respectively. First,
we evaluate the effects of attacks with different power levels
when the conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied for α = 0 to
verify that ours are more relaxed than the sufficient conditions
in [23]. Then the optimal static attack energy management
for the terminal error is obtained based on the exhaustion
Algorithm 2: Monotone Backward Induction Algorithm
Input: T ; S˜k; A˜;Pr;Rk; s˜1 = P )
Output: Maximum total reward R˜δ
∗
T+1(s˜1) = u˜
∗
1(s˜1);
Optimal deterministic Markovian policy
δ∗ = {δ∗1 , δ∗2 , . . . , δ∗T }
1 Set k = T + 1 and u˜∗T+1(s) = RT+1(s) for all s ∈ S˜k.
2 while k > 1 do
3 Let k = k − 1. Set s = P and A˜P = A˜.
4 while s < hk(P ) do
5 Compute u˜∗k(s) by
u˜∗k(s) = max
a∈A˜s
{
Rk(s, a)+
∑
j∈S˜k
Pr(j|s, a)u˜∗k+1(j)
}
.
Set
A˜∗s,k = arg max
a∈A˜s
{
Rk(s, a)+
∑
j∈S˜k
Pr(j|s, a)u˜∗k+1(j)
}
.
Let δ∗k(s) ∈ A˜∗s,k. Set
A˜h(s) = {a ∈ A˜ : a ≥ max[a′ ∈ A˜∗s,k]}.
Let s = h(s).
6 end
7 end
search method when the conditions in Proposition 1 do not
hold for α which is obtained based on (1)–(3). Similarly,
simulation examples for the average error are provided in the
sequel. We also solve the optimal dynamic energy manage-
ment problem and the optimal tradeoff problem, respectively,
based on Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, which implies that
the optimal dynamic policy has better performance than the
optimal static policy, and verifies that the optimal policy for
the optimal tradeoff problem has the monotone structure. The
system parameters A, C, Q and R, are given in Example 1.
A. Closed-form Solution for Terminal Error
In this subsection, we will adopt the same parameters with
Fig. 6 in [23] to verify the relaxation of our proposed sufficient
conditions. Let the packet dropout probability without attack
be α = 0. And the packet dropout probability without attack α
is obtained based on (1)–(3) in all the subsequent subsections.
The sensor sends the data packet with the packet length L =
20 to the remote estimator with the power δs = 10 through
a wireless link with the channel gain Gs = 1 and the noise
power σ2 = 2. The channel gain for the attacker is Ga = 1.
The maximal available power is ∆ = 200. The lower bound
and upper bound of δa, respectively, are δ = 20 and δ = 50.
Note that the value of T is not needed due to the expression
of the terminal error in (5) and the fact that α = 0.
In [23], the authors employ the exhaustion search method
to find the optimal attack level, since the system matrix A is
not normal. However, according to Example 1, the condition
1) in Proposition 1 is satisfied. And it is easy to verify the
satisfaction of the condition 2) in Proposition 1. Therefore,
the optimal attack level is δ = 20 from Theorem 1, which is
also illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Tr[JT ] under different attack power levels when the sufficient
conditions in Proposition 1 hold.
Fig. 3. Tr[JT ] under different attack power levels when the sufficient
conditions in Proposition 1 are not satisfied.
B. Solution for Terminal Error from Exhaustion Search
Method
All parameters are the same with Section VII. A except that
∆ = 50, δ = 2, δ = 20, and the considered time horizon
is T = 30. Then the condition 2) in Proposition 1 does not
hold. Hence, f(n) = arg max{x|b∆/xc = n, δ ≤ x ≤ δ}
may not be the optimal attack level, with n = b∆/δc = 25.
As shown in Fig. 3, the optimal attack level is δa∗ = 50/6,
with the optimal attack times 6 and the maximal trace of
expected terminal error covariance 17.5865. And note that the
conditions in Proposition 1 hold if δ = 10 and δ = 20, i.e.,
10 is the optimal attack level if δ = 10 and δ = 20, which
can be also seen from Fig. 3.
C. Closed-form Solution for Average Error
In this subsection, we will adopt the same parameters with
Section VII. A except that the considered time horizon is T =
Fig. 4. Tr[JA] under different attack power levels when the sufficient
conditions in Lemma 8 hold.
Fig. 5. Tr[JA] under different attack power levels when the sufficient
conditions in Lemma 8 are not satisfied.
15. It is easy to verify the satisfaction of the condition 1) and
2) in Lemma 8. Therefore, the optimal attack level is δ = 20
from Theorem 2, which is also illustrated in Fig. 4.
D. Solution for Average Error from Exhaustion Search Method
All parameters are the same with Section VII. B. Then
the conditions in Lemma 8 do not hold. Hence, f(n) =
arg max{x|b∆/xc = n, δ ≤ x ≤ δ} may not be the optimal
attack level, with n = b∆/δc = 25. As shown in Fig. 5, the
optimal attack level is δa∗ = 50/8, with the optimal attack
times 8 and the maximal trace of expected average error
covariance 3.2435.
E. Optimal Dynamic Attack Power Allocation with Given
Energy Constraint
In this subsection, we examine the proposed Algorithm 1.
Take the average error for example. Let the available power
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Fig. 6. Optimal decision tree for the optimal dynamic attack management
problem with the initial state s1 = (P , 60).
Fig. 7. Maximum Tr[JA] with varying maximum attack power ∆.
level set be Φ = {0, 5, 10, 15}. Here for ease of simulation,
set the corresponding probability set as {0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 0.9}.
The total energy constraint is ∆ = 60 and the considered
time horizon is T = 5. Then based on Algorithm 1, we can
utilize the value iteration algorithm in [31] to find the optimal
dynamic attack power policy which is described by Fig. 6. The
arrow goes to the possible state at the next time step. Here hk
refers to hk(P ). And under the optimal policy, the maximum
trace of average error, Rδ
∗
T+1(s1) = 8.0256, is achieved.
Then we compare the optimal static attack power policy and
the optimal dynamic attack power policy proposed in Section
IV and Section V, respectively, by changing the maximum
available power ∆ = 15, 16, . . . , 20. For ease of illustration,
we reset the system matrix as A =
[
1.01 3
0 1
]
. Fix the
available power level set as Φ = {0, 2, 2.25, 2.5, . . . , 9.75, 10}
with δ = 2 and δ = 10. Set T = 7, L = 20, δs = 2, Gs = 1,
Ga = 1 and σ2 = 0.5. The corresponding packet dropout
probability is calculated from (1)–(3). The result of the above
comparison is illustrated in Fig. 7, from which we can see
that the optimal dynamic policy has better performance than
the optimal static policy, i.e., the attacker can degenerate the
remote estimation quality more severely if it has the ability
of acquiring the real-time ACK information. And note that
Φ is not the interval [2, 10]. The attack effect can be further
Fig. 8. Optimal decision tree for the optimal tradeoff problem with the initial
state s1 = P .
improved if the available power set includes more elements
such as Φ = {0, 2, 2.01, 2.02, . . . , 9.99, 10}.
F. Dynamic Attack Power Allocation for Optimal Tradeoff
Problem
All parameters are the same with Fig. 6. Let the weighting
coefficient be ω = 0.35. Similar to the above subsection,
the optimal policy for the optimal tradeoff problem between
system degradation and energy consumption is obtained by
running the value iteration algorithm in [31]. Note that,
Algorithm 2 is not employed and the search space of action is
A˜ instead of A˜h(s) = {a ∈ A˜ : a ≥ max[a′ ∈ A˜∗s,k]}. This is
to verify the monotonicity of the optimal policy in Theorem
3. Then the optimal policy is shown in Fig. 8 from which we
can see that for a given time step k, δ∗k(s) is nondecreasing in
s. This is consistent with the theoretical result in Theorem 3.
The maximum total reward corresponding to the average error
is R˜δ
∗
T+1(s˜1) = 5.3325.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a system in which remote state estimation is
carried out was considered. We investigated how to allocate
the constant attack power to maximize two kinds of indexes
of system performance, Terminal error and Average error, re-
spectively, at the remote estimator when an energy-constrained
attacker launches a DoS attack against the SINR-based wire-
less channel. We proposed novel analysis approaches to derive
some sufficient conditions for two kinds of indexes, respec-
tively. An explicit solution to the issue of how much power
should be adopted was attained for both two kinds of indexes
if the system parameters meet the corresponding conditions.
Further we demonstrated that our proposed conditions for
Terminal error are more relaxed than the one in the existing
work. When the sufficient conditions fail to be satisfied,
a feasible method was provided to find the optimal attack
level for both two kinds of indexes. Then the case when
the attacker could acquire the real-time ACK information and
desires the time-varying attack power is studied and a MDP-
based algorithm is designed to find the optimal dynamic attack
power allocation. To optimize the tradeoff between system
degradation and attack energy, the other MDP-based algorithm
was further proposed based on which the optimal tradeoff can
be found. And a monotone structure of the optimal policy was
exploited such that the efficiency of the proposed algorithm
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can be improved dramatically. Finally, the effectiveness of the
theory was verified by the numerical examples.
APPENDIX
In this section, we prove Proposition 1, Lemma 7, Lemma
8 and Theorem 3. First the proof of Proposition 1 in detail is
provided.
Proof of Proposition 1: From the condition 2) in
Proposition 1, we can readily obtain that
β
n−n−1
(αβ
n − βn+1) ≤ αβn−1 − βn ≤ 0.
Since 0 < α < β ≤ β ≤ θ ≤ β < 1, there holds
αθn − βn+1 ≤ αβn − βn+1 ≤ 0. (24)
Let Tr(JTθ,β) = Tr(J
T )max(θ) − Tr(JT )max(β). Then in
light of (6), we have
Tr(JTθ,β) = Tr
{
(αθn − βn+1)
T∑
i=n+1
αi−n−1Hi
+
n∑
i=1
(θi − βi)Hi
}
.
From (24) and the condition 1) in Proposition 1, the fol-
lowing inequality is true:
Tr(JTθ,β) ≤Tr
{[ n∑
i=1
(β
i − βi) + (αβn − βn+1)
T−n−1∑
i=0
αi
]
×Hn
}
. (25)
Due to (24), there holds
[αβ
n
(1− βn−n−1) + βn+1(βn−n−1 − 1)]
≤βn+1(βn−n−1 − βn−n−1) ≤ 0,
which causes
(αβ
n − βn+1)
T−n−1∑
i=0
αi − (αβn−1 − βn)
T−n∑
i=0
αi
= [αβ
n
(1− βn−n−1) + βn+1(βn−n−1 − 1)]
T−n∑
i=0
αi
+ (αβ
n − βn+1)
T−n−1∑
i=T−n+1
αi ≤ 0.
Hence, it is obtained that
n∑
i=1
(β
i − βi) + (αβn − βn+1)
T−n−1∑
i=0
αi
≤
n−1∑
i=1
(β
i − βi) + (αβn−1 − βn)
T−n∑
i=0
αi,
which leads to, according to (25), Lemma 2, and the condition
2) in Proposition 1,
Tr(JTθ,β) ≤ 0.
The proof is completed.
Then we present the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 7: Let H(i, λ) =
∑T
k=1 E[Pk(λ)] with
P0 = h
i(P ), where T is the length of the time horizon for
an attack schedule λ. Let N = n + s, ψ1 = (λn, γs) and
ψ2 = (λn+1, γs−1). From the structure of φ1 = (γm, λn, γs),
φ2 = (γm, λn+1, γs−1) and Vi =
∑i
j=0 Fj , where Fi =∑T
k=1[pi,k(φ
1)− pi,k(φ2)], we can obtain
Vi(m,n, s, θ, β) =
i∑
j=0
T∑
k=1
(pj,k(φ
1)− pj,k(φ2))
=
i∑
j=0
T∑
k=m+1
(pj,k(φ
1)− pj,k(φ2)),
and
JAmax(φ
1)− JAmax(φ2)
=
1
T
T∑
k=1
{E[Pk(φ1)]− E[Pk(φ2)]}
=
1
T
T∑
k=m+1
{E[Pk(φ1)]− E[Pk(φ2)]}
=
1
T
T∑
i=0
hi(P )
T∑
k=m+1
(pi,k(φ
1)− pi,k(φ2)),
where,
T∑
k=m+1
E[Pk(φ1)] =
T∑
i=0
hi(P )
T∑
k=m+1
pi,k(φ
1)
=
m−1∑
j=0
(1− α)αjH(j, ψ1) + αmH(m,ψ1).
According to the equation
H(j, ψ1) = H(0, ψ1) +
N∑
i=1
pi,i[h
i+j(P )− hi(P )],
we can further obtain
T∑
k=m+1
E[Pk(φ1)]
=H(0, ψ1) +
m−1∑
j=0
(1− α)αj
N∑
i=1
pi,i[h
i+j(P )− hi(P )]
+ αm
N∑
i=1
pi,i[h
i+m(P )− hi(P )]
=H(0, ψ1) +
m∑
i=2
hi(P )[
i−1∑
j=1
αi−jpj,j −
i∑
j=1
αi−j+1pj,j ]
+
N∑
i=m+1
hi(P )[
i−1∑
j=i−m
αi−jpj,j −
i∑
j=i−m+1
αi−j+1pj,j ]
+
T−1∑
i=N+1
hi(P )[
N∑
j=i−m
αi−jpj,j −
N∑
j=i−m+1
αi−j+1pj,j ]
+ hT (P )αmpN,N − h(P )αp1,1, (26)
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where, pi,i = pi,i(ψ1) and
H(0, ψ1)
= P [n(1− θ) + s(1− α)] + hN (P )θnαs
+
s∑
i=1
hi(P )
[
θi + (n− i)(1− θ)θi
+
i∑
j=1
(1− θ)θi−jαj + (s− i)(1− α)αi]
+
N−1∑
i=n+1
hi(P )
[
θnαi−n +
N−i∑
j=1
(1− θ)θn−jαi−n+j]
+
n∑
i=s+1
hi(P )
[
θi + (n− i)(1− θ)θi
+
s∑
j=1
(1− θ)θi−jαj]. (27)
Before proceeding further, one equation is presented to
facilitate the analysis:
t2∑
i=t1
i+t3−t1∑
j=t3
(1− θ)θi−jαj
=
t2+t3−t1∑
j=t3
t2∑
i=j+t1−t3
(1− θ)θi−jαj
=
t2+t3−t1∑
j=t3
θt1−t3(1− θt2−t1+t3+1−j)αj . (28)
Based on (26) and (27), for i = 0, . . . , s− 1, there holds
i∑
j=0
T∑
k=m+1
pj,k(φ
1)
=
i∑
j=0
[(n− j)(1− θ)θj + (s− j)(1− α)αj ] +
i∑
j=1
θj
+ 2
i∑
j=2
j∑
t=1
(1− θ)θj−tαt −
i∑
j=2
αj + α(1− 2θ),
which, combining (28) and the equation
i∑
j=0
(n− j)(1− θ)θj = n− (n− i)θi+1 −
i∑
j=1
θj ,
leads to
Vi = (n− i+ 1)βi+1 − (n− i)θi+1 − αi+1
+ 2
i∑
j=1
αj(βi−j+1 − θi−j+1),
i.e., equation (16).
Similarly, equations (17)–(21) can be derived from (26) and
(27). The proof is completed.
Next, the proof of Lemma 8 is given as follows.
Proof of Lemma 8: It is hard to compare V ′i s
with different attack times since different attack times n
bring different packet dropout probabilities under attack.
To proceed to the next analytic step, we find the lower
bound of Vi(m,n, s, θ, β). From (16)–(21), there holds
Vi(m,n, s, θ, β) ≥ Vi(m,n, s, β, β), since each term with θ
is less than 0 and each term with β is positive. Next we
focus on the comparison between the obtained lower bounds of
Vi(m,n, s, θ, β), i.e., Vi(m,n, s, β, β). More specifically, we
investigate how Vi(m,n, s, β, β) varies with n. And for sim-
plicity of description, we write Vi(m,n, s, β, β) as Vi(m,n, s)
throughout the following derivation.
For ease of understanding, here we rewrite φ1 =
(γm, λn, γs), and φ2 = (γm, λn+1, γs−1). It is easy to see
from Lemma 7 that φ1 has two kinds of structures, (γs, λn, γs)
and (γs−1, λn, γs). According to Lemma 7, the expression
of Vi is dependent on the structure of φ1. Let m = d,
n = k and s = d. And we fix the length of the time
horizon as T = d + k + d. Then φ1 has the first structure
(γs, λn, γs), and the corresponding φ2 is (γd, λk+1, γd−1)
which, from Lemma 5, leads to the same average error with
(γd−1, λk+1, γd). When n = k + 1, φ1 = (γd−1, λk+1, γd)
has the second structure (γs−1, λn, γs) since T = d+ k + d,
and the corresponding φ2 is (γd−1, λk+2, γd−1). Similarly,
when n = k + 2, φ1 = (γd−1, λk+2, γd−1), again, has
the first structure (γs, λn, γs), and the corresponding φ2 is
(γd−1, λk+3, γd−2). Hence, different expressions of Vi should
be adopted as the attack times n increases. In the follow-
ing derivation, we first focus on the comparison between
Vi(d, k, d) which corresponds to the first structure (γs, λn, γs)
and Vi(d−1, k+1, d) that corresponds to the second structure
(γs−1, λn, γs).
We can set, in Lemma 7, m = d, n = k and s = d to
calculate Vi(d, k, d), and m = d− 1, n = k + 1 and s = d to
calculate Vi(d−1, k+1, d). Then we can derive the difference
between Vi(d, k, d) and Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d) as follows.
For i = 0, . . . , d− 1, it follows from (16) that
Vi(d, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d) = βi+1 − βi+1. (29)
For i = d, . . . , k, we have from (18) and (20) that
Vi(d, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d)
= β
i−d+1
(β
d − αd)− βi−d+1(βd − αd). (30)
For i = k + 1, due to (19) and (20), there holds
Vi(d, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d)
= αβ
k
(β − α) + αβk+1 − βk+2
+ αd(βk+2−d − βk+2−d). (31)
For i = k+ 2, . . . , N − 1, due to (19) and (21), there holds
Vi(d, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d)
= (i− k)αi−k−1[αβk(β − α)− βk+1(β − α)]
+ αi−k(β
k+1 − βk+1) + αd(βi−d+1 − βi−d+1). (32)
For i = N, . . . , T − 1, due to (17), there holds
Vi(d, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d)
= (T − i)αi−k−1[αβk(β − α)− βk+1(β − α)]. (33)
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Next we focus on the comparison between Vi(d − 1, k, d)
which corresponds to the second structure (γs−1, λn, γs) and
Vi(d − 1, k + 1, d − 1) that corresponds to the first structure
(γs, λn, γs). We can set, in Lemma 7, m = d− 1, n = k and
s = d to calculate Vi(d− 1, k, d), and m = d− 1, n = k + 1
and s = d − 1 to calculate Vi(d − 1, k + 1, d − 1). Then the
difference between Vi(d− 1, k, d) and Vi(d− 1, k+ 1, d− 1)
can be given as follows.3
For i = 0, . . . , d− 2, it follows from (16) that
Vi(d− 1, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d− 1)
=β
i+1 − βi+1. (34)
For i = d− 1, due to (16) and (20), there holds
Vi(d− 1, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d− 1)
= β
d − βd + αd−1β − αd. (35)
For i = d, . . . , k, we have from (20) that
Vi(d− 1, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d− 1)
= β
i−d+1
(β
d − αd)− βi−d+2(βd−1 − αd−1). (36)
For i = k + 1, due to (20) and (21), there holds
Vi(d− 1, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d− 1)
= αβ
k
(β − α) + αβk+1 − βk+2
+ αd−1βk+3−d − αdβk+2−d. (37)
For i = k + 2, . . . , N − 1, due to (21), there holds
Vi(d− 1, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d− 1)
= (i− k)αi−k−1[αβk(β − α)− βk+1(β − α)]
+ αi−k(β
k+1 − βk+1) + αd−1βi−d+2 − αdβi−d+1. (38)
For i = N, . . . , T − 1, due to (17), there holds
Vi(d− 1, k, d)− Vi(d− 1, k + 1, d− 1)
= (T − i)αi−k−1[αβk(β − α)− βk+1(β − α)]. (39)
Next we focus on the sign of equations (29)–(39) under the
condition 1) in Lemma 8 that the inequality, 2αβ
n−1−βn ≤ 0,
holds.
In the beginning, it is easy to see that
β
n−n−1
(2αβ
n − βn+1) ≤ 2αβn−1 − βn ≤ 0.
And we readily have equations (29) and (30) are positive.
According to the condition 1) in Lemma 8, there holds
αβ
k
(β − α) + αβk+1 − βk+2
≤αβk(β − α)− αβk+1 = −α2βk < 0,
which causes that equation (31) is less than 0.
3Here, k should be replaced with k + 1 since T = d + k + d. But in
fact, the derivation can proceed if we employ k instead of k + 1. Hence, for
simplicity, k is adopted here.
Then we focus on equations (32) and (33). Due to the
condition, it follows that
αβ
k
(β − α)− βk+1(β − α)
≤αβk(β − α)− βk+2 + αβk+1
≤− α2βk < 0.
The above result leads to
(i− k)αi−k−1[αβk(β − α)− βk+1(β − α)]
+ αi−k(β
k+1 − βk+1)
≤αi−k−1[αβk(β − α)− βk+1(β − α)]
+ αi−k(β
k+1 − βk+1)
=αi−k−1[2αβ
k+1 − α2βk − βk+2] ≤ 0,
from which we readily obtain that equations (32) and (33) are
negative.
It is easy to see that equations (34) and (35) are postive. And
from the sign of equation (30), equation (36) is also greater
than 0 since
β
i−d+1
(β
d − αd)− βi−d+2(βd−1 − αd−1)
>βi−d+1(βd − αd)− βi−d+2(βd−1 − αd−1)
=βi−d+1αd−1(β − α) > 0.
And similar to the derivation for equations (31)–(33), we
can prove that equations (37)–(39) are negative.
According to the sign of equations (29)–(39), we can obtain
that Vi(m,n, s, β, β) is a upper concave curve with n for
n > s. When n ≤ s, we can similarly derive the expression of
Vi and imitate the above proof process to obtain the same
result. Therefore, for any attack times n with n ≤ n ≤
n − 1, it follows that Vi(m,n, s, θ, β) ≥ Vi(m,n, s, β, β) ≥
min{Vi(m,n − 1, s, β, β), Vi(m,n, s, β, β)} ≥ 0, for i =
0, . . . , T −1, where m+ s = T −n+ 1, m = s or m = s−1,
m + s = T − n, and m = s or m = s − 1. The proof is
completed.
Finally, Theorem 3 is proved as follows.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} and
q(j|s, a) = ∑∞i=j Pr(hi(P )|s, a). According to Theorem
4.7.4 in [31], it suffices to prove that the following items are
true for k = 1, . . . , T .
1) Rk(s, a) is nondecreasing in s for all a ∈ A˜;
2) q(j|s, a) is nondecreasing in s for all j ∈ N and a ∈ A˜;
3) Rk(s, a) is a superadditive function on S˜× A˜;
4) q(j|s, a) is a superadditive function on S˜ × A˜ for all
j ∈ N;
5) RT+1(s) is nondecreasing in s.
Take Rk which corresponds to the average error for exam-
ple. For a given a, Rk(s, a) = Tr((1−βk(a))P+βk(a)h(s))−
ωa is nondecreasing in s due to Lemma 2, from which the
proof of 1) is completed.
Then for s+ ≥ s− in S˜ and a+ ≥ a− in A˜, there hold
Rk(s
+, a+)−Rk(s−, a+) = Tr(βk(a+)[h(s+)−h(s−)]) and
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Rk(s
+, a−) − Rk(s−, a−) = Tr(βk(a−)[h(s+) − h(s−)]),
which, in light of (1)–(3) and Lemma 2, lead to
Rk(s
+, a+)−Rk(s−, a+) ≥ Rk(s+, a−)−Rk(s−, a−).
And thereby, from Definition 3, the proof of 3) is completed.
To prove 2) and 4), the expression of q(j|s, a) is presented
based on (23) as follows. For j = 0, q is given by q(0|s, a) =
1, and for j = 1, 2, . . . and a given a, it follows that
q(j|s, a) =
{
0, if s < hj−1(P ),
β(a), if s ≥ hj−1(P ),
from which 2) is obtained.
For j = 0, 4) holds obviously. For j = 1, 2, . . ., there are
three cases. First, suppose that s+, s− < hj−1(P ). Apparently
4) holds. Second, suppose that s− < hj−1(P ) and s+ ≥
hj−1(P ). This generates q(j|s−, ·) = 0 and q(j|s+, a) =
β(a). Then we obtain 4) since β(a+) ≥ β(a−). Third, suppose
that s+, s− ≥ hj−1(P ). Then we have q(j|s+, a) = q(j|s−, a)
which implies that 4) is true.
5) is a direct result from the fact that RT+1 = 0. Then the
proof is completed.
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